A brand-new report is questioning the effectiveness of how betting integrity was monitored during the 2026 FIFA World Cup. The document argues most betting activity took place on illegal platforms which are beyond the reach of official monitoring systems.
The report, Nothing to See Here? Illegal Betting and the Limits of Integrity Monitoring, highlights conflicting assessments issued by FIFA and the Group of Copenhagen within 24 hours of each other.
In July, FIFA’s Integrity Task Force announced that it had not seen suspicious betting activity during the tournament. However, the Group of Copenhagen, which is an international network of national sports integrity platforms, reported that it had issued seven yellow notices.
These notices are issued when there are indications of potential betting anomalies that require further investigation. The report argues that the difference between the two assessments highlights the limitations of monitoring systems that rely primarily on information from regulated betting operators.
Illegal Markets Accounted for Most World Cup Betting
According to H2 Gambling Capital, the 2026 World Cup generated about $150 billion in sportsbook betting turnover.
Of this volume, regulated betting sites handled around $60 billion, while offshore platforms accounted for an estimated $90 billion. Hence, approximately 60% of sportsbook betting took place through offshore channels, much of which falls under the definition of illegal betting in the Council of Europe’s Macolin Convention.
H2GC also noted that another $6.7 billion in betting revenue equivalent through prediction markets, which brings the combined figure to approximately $157 billion.
Furthermore, the report claims that this distribution creates a major blind spot for integrity oversight. Monitoring organisations can analyse betting patterns and customer transactions reported by licensed operators, but, in general, they lack access to equivalent information from illegal platforms.
These unregulated markets include offshore operators using pseudo licences, crypto casinos, credit-based betting networks and betting arrangements facilitated through messaging applications.
Consequently, monitoring organisations may be able to observe publicly available odds offered by illegal operators but cannot access information about their customers, betting volumes or financial transactions.
Therefore, the report argues that FIFA’s conclusion that no suspicious activity was detected primarily reflected what monitoring organisations could observe within the regulated market.
Seven Yellow Notices Raised by the Group of Copenhagen
The Group of Copenhagen’s monitoring operation consists of 14 national platforms which covered all 104 World Cup matches. Its assessment included 15 matches with enhanced monitoring, seven yellow notices and 12 controversies requiring assessment.
The monitoring process examined odds movements, withdrawn betting offers, open-source information, social media activity and prediction markets. The full report is not published at the time of the assessment, but four of its seven yellow notices had been publicly reported.
Two incidents involved during matches. These included South African player Themba Zwane’s 84th-minute red card against Mexico after a VAR review, and a lengthy VAR delay before a Spain goal against Saudi Arabia was disallowed.
The other two reportedly involved prediction markets operated by the controversial Polymarket. One concerned approximately $4.8 million wagered on Spain not defeating Cape Verde. The match eventually ended in a goalless draw.
Another involved a market on whether US player Folarin Balogun would be available to play against Belgium. The market opened on the day he was sent off, while no comparable market was reportedly created for any of the other 14 players dismissed during the tournament.
The report stresses that these findings do not establish match manipulation or cheating. However, it argues that they represent potential integrity concerns requiring further investigation by independent investigators.
It also highlights the risks associated with prediction markets, where accounts are often anonymous and funded through cryptocurrency, leaving them outside established sports betting integrity monitoring systems.
World Cup Enforcement Operations Highlight Illegal Betting Activity
FIFA’s official monitoring operation reported no suspicious betting activity, but law enforcement across several countries performed extensive operations against illegal gambling during the tournament.
In Hong Kong, police arrested 991 people and seized betting records worth more than HKD 365 million, or around $47 million. Authorities also confiscated over HKD 7.4 million in cash and assets.
The offences included illegal bookmaking, facilitating unlawful betting, operating illegal gambling establishments and money laundering.
In Mainland China, the Ministry of Public Security’s cybersecurity bureau reported ten cases involving unauthorised betting operations, agents working for overseas gambling websites and illegal payment services.
Authorities dismantled illegal football betting groups across six provinces, including Hubei, Hunan, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan and Zhejiang.
Malaysian authorities were also quite busy, as the police arrested 554 people, including 213 foreign nationals, in 422 raids targeting illegal football betting and promotion during the World Cup. Authorities identified 263 websites being used for unlawful betting activities.
Meanwhile, Singapore police arrested 60 individuals connected to illegal betting around the tournament and blocked more than 600 websites, mobile applications and social media channels promoting unlawful gambling.
Financial investigations identified over 6,900 bank transactions linked to gambling operations, resulting in more than $600,000 in suspicious funds being blocked.
In Thailand, authorities reported 596 cases involving 629 suspects in June. These included 64 World Cup betting cases involving 80 individuals identified as bookmakers or organisers.
The report argues that these enforcement operations demonstrate the scope of illegal betting activity taking place outside the visibility of FIFA's integrity monitoring operation.
Seeking Better Transparency and Independent Monitoring
The report concludes that sports organisations should provide more detailed information about their integrity monitoring processes, particularly when making public statements that no suspicious betting activity has been identified.
It argues that such conclusions should clearly explain which markets were monitored, what information was available and which areas remained outside the monitoring process.
The Group of Copenhagen's approach to monitoring prediction markets throughout the tournament is described as a positive development. However, the report calls for this type of monitoring to become standard practice at major sporting events.
It also recommends greater independent oversight of betting integrity investigations, with national integrity platforms linked to law enforcement agencies identified as suitable organisations to support this work.
According to the report, independent monitoring and more comprehensive public reporting are necessary to maintain confidence in the integrity of major sporting competitions.
It warns that the scale of illegal betting markets makes it difficult to draw broad conclusions about sporting integrity based solely on regulated betting data. While illegal markets remain difficult to monitor, their significance means they cannot be ignored.
